

SECRET
SECURITY INFORMATION

EOQ-A- 24188

1 SEP 1958

Chief, BOB
Attention: ☐
Chief of Mission, Frankfurt

REDCAP/Operational
Lead Obtained from KIBITZ 137

1. In March of this year, plans were considered to change the KIBITZ 15 chain from a stay-behind project into a REDCAP net. At that time, KIBITZ 15, the principal agent, was briefed on our REDCAP interests.
2. As a result of this briefing, KIBITZ 137 (Identity 1) contacted his sister-in-law (Identity 2) who is a nurse in an East Berlin hospital (address follows) and Identity 3, a co-worker of his sister-in-law. KIBITZ 137 told them that he was representing an unspecified German organization, and that he would like to establish contact with Soviet officers who had an understanding of the East and a desire for West-East cooperation. Both girls stated that they had encountered such people in their professional capacity, and both added that a number of Soviet officers would join the East if it were not for the fear of being returned after making the break. KIBITZ 137 arranged a simple code by which the nurses were to inform him of any contact with Soviet officers with Western inclinations.
3. Since the best judgment of the KUBARK officers who had dealt with the KIBITZ 15 net was that it could not be adequately controlled, the operation was closed out in June, and KIBITZ 137 was dropped. He was never in direct contact with an American case officer, but submitted reports only through the principal agent.
4. A cable from Murnberg, dated 17 August 1953, stated that KIBITZ 137 had approached a soldier at the Murnberg air strip and claimed that he had been employed by the Americans since 1946. He stated that he "knew of the defection of two nurses from the DHR", and wanted to contact his former "case officer" to report this information.

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34-61-31-1619

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EXEMPTIONS Section 3(b)

- (2)(A) Privacy ☐
(2)(B) Methods/Sources ☒
(2)(G) Foreign Relations ☐

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Date: 2005

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He had been to his former contact house, but had found it closed, and could not report his information through that channel. (The address given was that of the former KIBITZ safe-house).

5. We can only speculate as to why KIBITZ 137 took this method of getting in touch with us, rather than going through individuals with whom he was associated in the old KIBITZ 15 net. It may be that the security in the net was better than we think it was, and that KIBITZ 137 could not locate his former contacts. We also wonder at his claim to have been employed by the Americans since 1946, as our records indicate employment with this organization only since 1951, and we have no further traces in our files. We also suspected that the reported defection of two DDR nurses might actually be a garble of defection leads from two DDR nurses which might have been the outcome of the interview between Identities 1, 2, and 3 described in paragraph 2 above.

6. We queried Murnberg on the exact dates Identity 1 claimed employment with the U. S., as to what case officer he wanted to contact (since no American had actually been in contact with him), and as to whether the nurses wanted to defect or were in contact with defection prospects.

7. A Reply from Murnberg, 27 August 1953, stated that CIC was no longer in contact with KIBITZ 137 and that further information could therefore not be obtained. Additional facts on hand however were that the nurses were to fly 20 August from Berlin to Frankfurt, and were to contact KIBITZ 137 in Heidelberg to pass on "valuable information". Frankfurt would be able to make contact with KIBITZ 137 by calling a telephone number (number follows), and asking for him by his real name.

8. We are inclined to believe the nurses themselves did not defect since they would presumably not yet have documentation allowing them to fly into the Zone, and in view of the remark in the second Murnberg cable that they had "important information" to pass on.

9. We are very reluctant to reestablish contact with any link in the KIBITZ chain; however, the judgment of the former KIBITZ case officer here is that the by-passing of KIBITZ 137 in contacting his sister-in-law might upset the good relations with which the operation was terminated. It is also recognized that the nurses will be more ready to deal with KIBITZ 137 than with a stranger who might contact them and try to establish his bona fides.

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10. If you feel this lead is worth following up, the opinion here is that the person who will handle the lead from Berlin should also make the initial contact here. The former KIBITZ case officer here stresses that the contact should be made by an obviously American but German-speaking case officer. This is because of the intense nationalism of the KIBITZ chain, the unfavorable reaction of its members to former Germans turned American, and the difficulty a person who could be identified as a German would have in establishing his bona fides.

11. We realize the loopholes in this account, and want to weigh the lead carefully to be sure it is worth reason acting a member of the Kibitz chain. The net was noted for its violent anti-communism, and it is considered unlikely that KIBITZ 137 is approaching us on instructions from the opposition. Such information as the KIBITZ chain did produce, was felt by the case officer to have been generally good.

12. The problem is therefore presented for your action.

DISTRIBUTION:

3-EE w s/s attach
2-ROB "
2-FHB "

Approved: _____

Date of origin: 31 August 1953

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Separate Cover Attachment to

EGQ-A- 24188

1 SEP 1953

1. Identity 1: ☐ ☐
2. Identity 2: ☐ ☐ (or possibly ☐ per ☐
Berlin, ☐ East ☐
3. Identity 3: ☐ ☐ Berlin
4. Telephone number: ☐ ☐
5. Sister of ☐ ☐ lives in West Berlin. and is ☐

We have no traces on the above individuals
other than those tied in with this case.

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